Barsukov, E. Z. Russia's Preparation for the World War in Terms of Artillery (Podgotovka Rossii k mirovoy voyne v artilleriyskom otnoshenii), 1926. In Russian.

Барсуков Е. З.
Подготовка России к мировой войне в артиллерийском отношении. / С предисловием В. А. Меликова. (Издание Управления по исследованию и использованию опыта войн Штаба РККА).
Москва — Ленинград : Государственное военное издательство (Госвоениздат), 1926.
216 с. ; Обычный формат. Издательский картонажный переплет.
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Barsukov, Evgeny.
Russia's Preparation for the World War in Terms of Artillery. / With a preface by V. A. Melikov. (Publication of the Directorate for the Study and Use of War Experience of the Staff of the RKKA).
Moscow — Leningrad : State Military Publishing House (Gosvoenizdat), 1926.
216 pp. ; Regular format. Original paper-covered boards (cartonage). 

This 1926 monograph is a fundamental work of Soviet military science, written by the preeminent authority on Russian heavy ordnance, Evgeny Zakharovich Barsukov. A former Major General of the Imperial Army who became a pillar of Soviet military academia, Barsukov was uniquely positioned to analyze the technical and logistical failings of the Tsarist military machine. Published by the Staff of the Red Army (RKKA) to distill lessons from the Great War, the book provides a deep dive into the internal logic of pre-1914 military planning, including the arrangement of the "Big Program" for strengthening the army, the state of the domestic arms industry, and the chronic shortages of heavy shells and long-range guns. Barsukov meticulously documents the discrepancy between Russia’s strategic ambitions and its industrial capacity, offering an unparalleled look at the artillery crisis that defined the Eastern Front.
The 216-page volume features a critical preface by V. A. Melikov and serves as a precursor to Barsukov's monumental multi-volume studies for which he would later receive the Stalin Prize. The text is not merely a historical record but a scientific post-mortem of the Imperial General Staff's errors, intended to educate the new generation of Soviet commanders. Published by Gosvoenizdat during the peak of the NEP-era military reforms, the book reflects the high scholarly standards and critical self-reflection of 1920s military thought. For bibliophiles, military historians, and collectors of Soviet strategy, this 1926 edition is a significant primary source, documenting the transition from Imperial military heritage to the modernized doctrine of the Red Army.